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Abstract 
Large-scale migration of workers from new EU member states to the Nordic 
countries, mostly to fill relatively low-skilled jobs in construction, manufactur-
ing and services, has raised concerns of low-wage competition and the ability of 
the Nordic social model to uphold labour standards. This article explores varia-
tions in wages and working conditions among Polish migrant workers in Oslo, 
Copenhagen and Reykjavik. The analysis highlights how different institutional 
configurations within the Nordic labour markets shape the outcomes for migrant 
workers, and raises questions regarding the ability of the different variations of 
the Nordic labour market regime to protect workers in an open, unequal and 
mobile European labour market. 
 
Introduction 
EU enlargement in 2004 was followed by large-scale labour migration from 
Central and Eastern Europe to the Nordic countries. Unlike Sweden, which 
opened its labour market immediately, Norway, Denmark and Iceland intro-
duced transitional restrictions on the movement of workers from the new mem-
ber states; but these were removed by 2009. Most new migrants come from 
Poland, where wages are below one fifth of Nordic levels, and most are recruit-
ed to fill low-skilled jobs in construction, manufacturing and services. Policy-
makers and trade unionists have largely welcomed these new migrants as a 
profitable and necessary contribution to the domestic labour force, but have 
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been concerned at the risks of ‘social dumping’, labour market segmentation 
and the spread of precarious working conditions. 
All Nordic labour markets share common features such as strong labour 
market organizations and centralized collective bargaining, yet they vary in 
their institutional mechanisms for regulation of wages and working conditions. 
This article examines how far the different regimes in Norway, Denmark and 
Iceland have protected the new migrant workers from exploitative conditions. It 
explores this question through an analysis of the relationship between the na-
tional labour market institutions in the three countries and the actual working 
conditions among Polish migrant workers in Oslo, Copenhagen and Reykjavik. 
First, we relate the issue of migrant incorporation to the general debate on 
‘social dumping’. Then we outline the institutional frameworks of labour mar-
ket regulation in the three countries and explain our data and methodology. We 
use survey data to compare the situation of Polish migrants in the three capital 
cities, describing their place in the labour market, their hourly wages and their 
general working conditions. We also perform regression analysis to determine 
which factors affect wages and working conditions. Finally, we discuss how 
contemporary Nordic models of labour market regulation have coped with in-
creasing free movement of workers. 
 
Social dumping and labour market incorporation of the new 
migrants 
‘Social dumping’ is difficult to define (Bernaciak, 2012) but usually implies 
that labour migrants receive unacceptably low wages or standards of work. The 
underlying mechanisms are relatively straightforward. Employers looking to 
reduce labour costs can recruit workers from countries with substantially lower 
living conditions and pay rates undercutting established standards (Lillie, 2010; 
McGovern, 2007; Woolfson et al., 2010); while migrants from poorer countries 
may be willing to accept conditions substantially below host country standards 
(Piore, 1980; Woolfson, 2007), since these are still superior to those back home 
(Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). 
 
Table 1. Union density, collective agreement coverage and extension procedures 
 Denmark (2009) Iceland (2011) Norway (2009) 
Union density (%) 68 85 52 
Collective agreement  
coverage (%) 
80 99 74 
Legal extension of collective 
agreements 
None Widespread Some 
Source: Eldring and Alsos (2012); Nergaard (2010) 
 
In addition to the concern for the financial well-being of the migrant workers 
themselves, debates on ‘social dumping’ has been driven by at least three dif-
ferent but overlapping concerns. First, there is immediate concern on behalf of 
native workers – and in particular those whose labour market position is already 
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weak – that labour migration may drive down wages and labour standards. Sec-
ond, there is a concern for the medium-term viability of existing labour market 
institutions because increasing inequality between ethnic and national groups 
poses a range of challenges to their functioning and legitimacy; this results in 
debate on the compatibility of Nordic labour market institutions with EU law, 
and the possible need for labour legislation to supplement or replace collective 
agreements. Third, there is a concern for the long-term sustainability of the wel-
fare state: although new migrants initially display high rates of employment and 
place few burdens on welfare expenditure, there are fears that today’s cheap and 
flexible workers (Meardi et al., 2012) may become tomorrow’s marginalized 
welfare dependants. 
Yet is it inevitable that new migrant workers will suffer from sub-standard 
wages and precarious working conditions? We address this question, asking 
how and to what extent Nordic societies are able to incorporate new migrant 
workers into existing labour market structures and protect them from wage 
dumping and exploitative working conditions (Goldring and Landolt, 2011). 
 
Migrant workers and labour market regulation in Norway, 
Denmark and Iceland 
The incorporation of immigrants is shaped by the institutional context of the 
host societies (Anderson, 2010; Portes, 1995). Under conditions of free move-
ment, labour market institutions constitute the primary framework and oppor-
tunity structure facing both mobile workers and the employers who recruit 
them. Most European labour markets have substantial legal regulation, includ-
ing minimum wages; but in the Nordic countries, wages are primarily deter-
mined by collective agreements between unions and employers’ organizations. 
Central features of the Nordic model are high union density, extensive worker 
representation and centralized agreements, with a close interaction between 
working-life policies, the welfare state and macroeconomic policies (Dølvik, 
2011). Yet considerable differences exist regarding the level of organization and 
collective agreement coverage. Table 1 gives an overview for our three coun-
tries. 
Unionization rates in the Nordic countries remain high, but have decreased 
over the last 15 years, particularly in Sweden, Finland and Denmark (Nergaard, 
2010). Iceland stands out with very high density and bargaining coverage. De-
spite some decline, the Danish unions also retain a strong position. Norway 
stands out with a lower density, though still high compared to most European 
countries. The industries where most new migrants have found employment 
display much lower unionization and coverage rates.  
None of the countries has a statutory minimum wage; instead, the social 
partners have the main responsibility for wage regulation. Nordic trade unions 
vehemently oppose statutory minimum wages, and employers have only occa-
sionally supported these. The dominant view holds that a statutory minimum 
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wage breaches the autonomy of the collective bargaining partners (Eldring and 
Alsos, 2012). 
In principle, agreements are binding only on the signatories (and on non-
unionized workers in companies covered by agreements), but only Denmark 
and Sweden have no supplementary procedures. In Iceland, the provisions of 
collective agreements are automatically applied as a minimum to all employees. 
In Norway, it has been possible since 1993 to make collective agreements gen-
erally binding; but this did not occur until 2004, when the inflow of workers 
from the new member states exposed existing weaknesses in the regulatory 
system, with large sections of the labour market exposed to low-wage competi-
tion (Alsos and Eldring, 2008). Following internal debates, Landsorganisasjo-
nen i Norge (LO) applied for extension of the collective agreement in construc-
tion, and parts of the collective agreements in construction, ship-building, agri-
culture and cleaning are now universally applicable. Denmark (like Sweden) 
has faced similar challenges of lowwage competition; but so far the unions have 
resisted any extension mechanism. 
Legally binding or not, minimum wage requirements in collective agree-
ments are usually well below industry averages, but with considerable differ-
ences between the three countries. Iceland, in particular, appears to have more 
wage flexibility within collective agreements, with minima for unskilled work-
ers relatively lower compared to average earnings than in the two other coun-
tries. The Icelandic labour market also has more flexible regulations on hiring 
and firing. There is also significant variation between the countries in terms 
both of the conditions regulated through statutory measures, and the capacity of 
national labour authorities to enforce them.  
Opportunities to bypass regulations by competing outside the organized la-
bour market also vary. If the regulations were observed, almost all migrant 
workers in Iceland would receive collectively agreed wages, and likewise in 
Norway for those in sectors covered by extended agreements. In Denmark, 
workers employed in companies without collective agreements would run 
greater risks of earning sub-standard wages, as would be the case in Norway in 
sectors without a generally binding agreement. Given the considerable differ-
ences in the ratio between collectively agreed minima and average sector wage 
levels, and in the general wage levels between the Nordic countries, the actual 
wage outcome for the migrant workers may have different patterns (Eldring and 
Alsos, 2012). Collectively bargained minima in Iceland are for example far 
below average standards and rarely apply to native workers, while Danish min-
ima are usually closer to normal wages. 
 
Data and research design 
Our central research question was how these variations in labour market regula-
tion in the three countries shape actual outcomes in terms of wages and working 
conditions for recent labour migrants. Designing a study to answer this question 
posed two major challenges. 
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The first was to establish representative data on wages and working condi-
tions among recent migrants. We chose to focus on Polish migrant workers, by 
far the largest group of coming to the Nordic countries since 2004. However, 
travelling and working under conditions of free movement, they are not an easy 
population to target in quantitative research. Official data cover only parts of the 
migrant population and provide limited information about their conditions. For 
a number of reasons (lack of a sampling frame, high levels of mobility, uncon-
ventional housing, long hours and privacy concerns related to legal status), or-
dinary sampling techniques produce data with limited validity. As a solution, 
we adopted a technique called Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS), which was 
developed to produce statistically unbiased estimates from samples of hidden 
and hardto- reach populations where no sampling frame exists (Heckathorn, 
1997; Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004; Volz and Heckathorn, 2008). 
The RDS method consists of two elements: first, a structured collection of a 
broad sample covering the entire variation within the target population, using a 
type of chain referral sampling; second, mathematical estimators which take 
account of the bias which occurs as a result of the network-based sampling pro-
cedure.
1
 By applying RDS we can give a representative and comprehensive 
picture of the migrant population at a given time in each city, irrespective of the 
migrants’ legal status or registration. A pilot study was conducted in Oslo in 
2006 (Friberg, 2010; Friberg and Tyldum, 2007); the data are not included in 
this article. In 2008, a similar study was conducted in Copenhagen. In 2010, the 
study was replicated in Oslo and a survey was conducted in Reykjavik. In each 
survey, about 500 Polish migrants were interviewed face to face by a team of 
Polishspeaking interviewers. 
The second challenge was the causal relationship between information on 
wages and working conditions among Polish migrant workers and the institu-
tional framework of labour market regulation in each country. We therefore 
designed a comparative case study using each city as a case; but this creates two 
problems. First, our data on institutional configurations, average wages and 
policy responses are based on the national level, while those on working condi-
tions among Polish migrants only cover the capital cities, which have distinctive 
labour market structures. The findings cannot therefore be generalized to the 
entire country, since the surveys do not capture migrants employed in agricul-
ture, shipyards, oil refineries, hydro-electric power plants and certain types of 
industrial manufacturing. Nevertheless, the situation in the capital cities does 
reflect institutional features at the national level, and can give indications on 
how national systems function. 
The second problem concerns the ratio of variables to cases, and the influ-
ence of external factors. We measure labour market outcomes for Polish mi-
grants through several different indicators along different dimensions, including 
absolute and relative wages, type of employment and risk of experiencing dif-
ferent forms of precarious or exploitative treatment at work. The factors thought 
to affect these outcomes include collective agreement coverage and unioniza-
tion rates, the extent and use of statutory regulation and enforcement of wages 
  
   
6 
and labour standards, and institutional flexibility in terms of how minimum 
wage rates compare to average rates and the ease with which employers can hire 
and fire workers. Nevertheless, there are exogenous factors not related to any 
particular institutional feature that also may affect differences in labour market 
outcomes, such as the selection of migrants going to the three countries. How-
ever, the survey showed that in terms of gender, age and education level, these 
differences were negligible. A more serious problem is the somewhat different 
economic and cyclical context of the three countries at the time of the surveys. 
The Norwegian economy had, in 2010, mostly recovered from a mild uncertain-
ty following the international financial crisis, while Iceland was in the midst of 
a full-blown crisis. The Danish survey was conducted in 2008, just as the eco-
nomic shock was starting. In a three-way case study, there is no way of control-
ling for such cyclical effects. Therefore, the regression analysis has been per-
formed on a city-by-city basis and the comparison between these models cannot 
determine the exact causal relationship between any specific set of institutional 
variables and actual outcomes. However, we construct a descriptive typology of 
how particular institutional features are combined with particular outcomes in 
each city, which reveals important similarities and differences. 
 
Regulatory frameworks, wages and working conditions 
We now present an empirical description of the three cases, in terms of institu-
tional context and labour market outcomes for Polish workers, and conclude by 
discussing some of the key dilemmas facing Nordic labour markets in a context 
of increasing transnational mobility. 
 
‘Weak’ collectivism, ad hoc universalization and precarious incorporation 
in Oslo 
Norway has been the primary destination among the Nordic countries for Polish 
migrants since EU accession, with Oslo attracting a large share. The migrants in 
our survey are on average 36 years old; the men slightly older than the women. 
The majority are skilled: 62 percent have some kind of vocational education, 
and 17 percent have university degrees, with a higher proportion among the 
women. By contrast, Polish migrants in the UK and Ireland tend to be much 
younger, with higher qualifications; this may reflect the relative inaccessibility 
of the Nordic languages and the large demand for manual labour (Kaczmarczyk, 
2010). Norway is one of the most expensive countries in Europe, so migrants 
workers can gain considerably by transferring part of their wages back to Po-
land.  
Our surveys show that the Polish population in Oslo is dominated by male 
workers, who often leave their families behind in Poland in order to work tem-
porarily in Norway. In recent years this pattern has changed, with more women 
and children arriving.
2
 The labour market for Polish migrants in Oslo is highly 
concentrated and gender segregated: 85 percent of the men work in construc-
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tion, and most women are employed in lowskilled services – mainly domestic 
cleaning but also hotels and restaurants. 
Norway has the highest wages in the Nordic countries and thus the largest 
scope for low-wage competition. It also has the lowest bargaining coverage, 
leaving large parts of the labour market unregulated in terms of minimum wag-
es. In many key industries, the institutional basis of collective bargaining and 
enforcement is much weaker than in the other Nordic countries. Facing increas-
ing labour migration after EU enlargement, Norwegian policy-makers and so-
cial partners quickly realized that the existing institutional framework was in-
sufficient to maintain basic labour standards in the most exposed industries. 
Labour market regulation policies have in recent years gradually moved from 
voluntary collective arrangements towards what can be labelled ad hoc univer-
salism, marked by increasing state involvement in wage regulation. This has 
included the legal extension of minimum provisions in collective agreements, 
noted above (so far in construction, shipyards, agriculture and cleaning) and 
increased state control and enforcement. Additionally, legislation has been in-
troduced on supply-chain liability, making all those in the chain of subcontrac-
tors liable for violations of generally binding collective agreements (Eldring et 
al., 2011). 
 
Table 2. Average hourly wages 
 Oslo Copenhagen Reykjavik 
Wages in PLN 71 54 30 
As % of host country average 65 85 57 
Purchasing power
a
 29 27 16 
aBased on OECD data for the years of surveys (2008 for Copenhagen, 2010 for Oslo and Rey-
kjavik). The factors used to divide the nominal wages are 2.04 for Denmark, 2.42 for Norway 
and 1.83 for Iceland. 
 
Our survey suggests that these measures, introduced through two consecutive 
government action plans against social dumping, have had some success in es-
tablishing a relatively high wage floor among new migrants. In terms of hourly 
wages, Oslo stands out as the most attractive of the three cities (Table 2). Polish 
migrants in Oslo earn on average the equivalent of 71 złoty (PLN) per hour in 
Oslo (4 PLN = €1), roughly four times their earnings in Poland. However, this 
is only 65 percent of average hourly earnings of Norwegian wage earners, 
though 73 percent of average earnings in construction. There is considerable 
variation in earnings among Polish migrant workers, with a standard deviation 
of some 20 percent; one in five Polish construction workers received less than 
the minimum wage for unskilled workers, five years after the legal extension 
came into effect. 
A regression analysis (not presented here, but available from the authors) 
suggests which factors are related to receiving low wages. Low-skilled services, 
when controlling for all relevant factors, provide significantly lower wages than 
construction, which in turn pays less than work outside these two main sectors. 
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There is no significant effect of gender, although women generally earn less 
because they tend to work in low-wage sectors. Human capital in the form of 
schooling beyond the obligatory 12 years only has a weak and non-significant 
positive effect on hourly wages. There is a positive and significant effect of  
length of stay, indicating some improvement in wages over time; but there is a 
strong negative effect of being employed through Polish subcontractor firms,  
confirming that transnational service provision and posting of workers have 
been major drivers of low-wage competition in Norway (Alsos and Eldring, 
2008; Dølvik and Eldring, 2008). Working in a firm without trade union repre-
sentation, or for firms catering to the private household market, are both associ-
ated with low wages. 
 
Table 3. Type of employment 
 Oslo Copenhagen Reykjavik 
Permanent, national firm 26 36 80 
Temporary, national firm 24 23 11 
Temporary agency 15 13 1 
Foreign company 21 19 5 
Self-employed 15 9 3 
 
 
Table 4. Percentages reporting indicators of precarious, exploitative and illegal 
working 
 Reykjavik Copenhagen Oslo 
Has been cheated out of pay 27 33 34 
Has worked overtime without pay 12 27 45 
Has experienced threats by employer 9 20 13 
Has no written contract 10 14 28 
Cannot take paid sick leave 8 32 33 
 
Though Oslo is by far the most attractive destination of the three capitals in 
absolute monetary terms, it is where Polish migrant workers are least likely to 
find regular employment. Only 26 percent in total, and even fewer in the main 
industries of construction and cleaning, had permanent employment in Norwe-
gian firms. The majority were hired on a temporary basis, usually through staff-
ing agencies or Polish subcontractors (very common in construction) or as self-
employed, sometimes operating in the informal economy (Table 3). Oslo also 
stands out by having a significant market for domestic services, employing 31 
percent of Polish workers. Work in private households is particularly common 
among cleaners, but there are also many construction workers providing build-
ing and maintenance services to private households. A relatively weak link to 
the labour market also meant that Polish workers in Oslo were particularly vul-
nerable to labour market exclusion and unemployment in the period of econom-
ic uncertainty after the international financial crisis (Friberg, 2012). 
Oslo is also where Polish migrants are most likely to experience different 
kinds of precarious and illegal working conditions (Table 4). Each of these ex-
periences indicates a precarious situation in the workplace, and this is not con-
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centrated on a small group: overall, 76 percent of Polish workers report at least 
one of these experiences during their stay in Norway, and 64 percent report on 
of them in their current job in Oslo. 
 In order to determine which factors are associated with precarious work, we 
perform a logistic regression model predicting the odds of having experienced 
any of the mentioned indicators in the current job (not presented here, but avail-
able from the authors). We find that many of the same factors associated with 
low wages are also associated with precarious working conditions: workers in 
service industries are more at risk than construction workers, who in turn are 
more at risk than those outside these two industries; there is no effect of gender, 
education level or length of stay; there is a strong connection between ‘atypical’ 
employment and precarious working conditions. And while low wages were 
primarily related to work for Polish subcontractor firms, precariousness is relat-
ed to all kinds of atypical employment, including fixed-term contracts, tempo-
rary staffing agencies and self-employment. Working in firms without trade 
union representation does not significantly affect the likelihood of experiencing 
precarious and exploitative conditions. There is, however, a strong effect of 
providing services to private households, suggesting that workers in this market 
are particularly vulnerable to arbitrary treatment. 
To sum up, the results show that transnational service provision and posting 
of workers drive both low wage competition and poor working conditions in 
Oslo. Given the relatively high wages in absolute terms, it seems probable that 
new statutory policies of minimum wage regulation have had some success in 
imposing collectively agreed minima on migrant-intensive labour markets. They 
do, however, appear to be less successful in incorporating migrant workers into 
the existing institutional framework of employment relations. Instead, new 
forms of atypical, temporary and insecure employment have become the norm 
in migrant-intensive labour markets, leaving migrant workers exposed to a wide 
range of precarious and often illegal conditions at work, including lack of writ-
ten contracts, unpaid overtime, outright fraud and inability to claim basic rights. 
 
Copenhagen: Insiders and outsiders in the Danish model 
In absolute numbers, Denmark has been the second most important destination 
for Polish migrant workers among the Nordic countries. Our data suggest that 
the composition of Polish migrants working in Copenhagen is quite similar to 
that in Oslo, but with some differences. They are on average four years younger 
than in Oslo, male workers are slightly less overrepresented, and fewer report 
having a spouse in Poland. In terms of education, there is no significant differ-
ence compared to Oslo: most have some sort of vocational training, and 20 per-
cent have completed university level education. Polish migrants in Copenhagen 
are found in more diverse sectors and occupations: the construction sector is the 
most important employer for males, but less dominant than in Oslo, employing 
‘only’ 44 percent of the men. Low-skilled services are equally important, em-
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ploying 48 percent of the total Polish workforce. In Copenhagen this category 
includes a more varied set of occupations, including newspaper delivery, kitch-
en work and some types of customer-related services. A significant proportion 
of both men and women work in industrial manufacturing, warehouses and 
storages. 
While political debates over social dumping and low-wage competition have 
been quite similar in Denmark and Norway, Denmark has sought to maintain 
the existing framework of voluntary collective bargaining: the social partners 
have opposed any moves towards increasing state regulation in response to in-
ternational labour mobility (Andersen and Pedersen, 2010; Malchow-Møller et 
al., 2009). The high level of collective agreement coverage, high union density 
and a relative freedom for unions to take industrial action may explain this posi-
tion (Eldring et al., 2012). Thus, it is assumed that the stronger Danish frame-
work is sufficient to resist low-wage competition and worker exploitation in the 
face of increasing labour migration.  
Although Copenhagen is a less attractive destination for Polish migrant 
workers in absolute monetary terms, their earnings relative to the average Dan-
ish worker are far higher than in Oslo, about 85 percent of the national average 
(Table 2). When controlling for price levels, their purchasing power in Copen-
hagen is roughly equal to that of Polish migrants in Oslo. But this picture looks 
quite different when we examine the construction sector in isolation: Polish 
construction workers in Copenhagen earn only 65 percent of the average Danish 
construction worker, and as many as 40 percent earn less than the minimum 
wage stipulated in the collective agreements for the sector. Hence we find that 
Polish workers in Copenhagen are on average better off relative to native work-
ers than in Oslo, but the situation in construction is reversed, where more than 
twice as many construction workers receive less than the minimum wage in 
Copenhagen compared to Oslo. This reflects the particular challenges faced by 
Danish construction unions in regulating the terms and conditions of Eastern 
European workers (Andersen and Arnholtz Hansen, 2008). In the other indus-
tries where our respondents are employed, these problems seem less prevalent. 
Our regression analysis of hourly wages shows that most of the same factors 
associated with low wages in Oslo also apply in Copenhagen. As in Oslo, trans-
national service provision and posting of workers are significantly associated 
with low wages. Gender has a slightly stronger effect on wages in Copenhagen 
than in Oslo, while length of stay has a much weaker impact. We also find that 
working in firms without trade union representatives and working for private 
household clients has a stronger negative impact in Copenhagen than in Oslo.  
The differences between Oslo and Copenhagen in labour market outcomes 
for Polish workers in the construction industry compared to other industries 
illustrate the institutional differences between the two countries. In Oslo, Polish 
migrant workers primarily work in low-wage sectors with very low organization 
rates and collective agreement coverage. The construction sector is no excep-
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tion, but having been the main target for statutory anti-dumping policies in re-
cent years, the sector has since 2004 had much stronger minimum wage regula-
tions than other affected sectors. In Copenhagen, Poles also work in low-wage 
sectors, but with higher union density and collective agreement coverage rates 
than in Oslo securing a more egalitarian wage structure (Arnholtz Hansen and 
Hansen, 2009). Construction is not a low-wage sector in the same sense, and is 
marked by strong trade unions, fairly substantial wage increases, but also a high 
degree of wage flexibility between minimum levels and the average wage (Arn-
holtz and Hansen, 2013). Local wage negotiation plays an important role in 
Danish construction, and Polish migrants are in a poor bargaining position. As a 
result they end up relatively more disadvantaged than their counterparts in Oslo. 
As in Oslo, we find that the majority of workers have some type of atypical 
employment, with both fixed-term contracts, work through temporary staffing 
agencies and Polish subcontractors and self-employment being common (Table 
3). Compared to Oslo, however, a slightly higher proportion of workers − 36 
percent – have regular permanent employment in a Danish firm. Polish migrants 
in Copenhagen are also at risk of experiencing the same kind of precarious and 
exploitative working conditions as in Oslo, although to a slightly lesser degree 
(Table 4). 62 percent of Polish workers in Copenhagen report that they have 
experienced at least one of the five forms listed during their stay in Denmark, 
and 52 percent report having experienced one of them in their current job. The 
logistic regression model predicting the odds of having experienced exploitative 
working conditions in their current job shows patterns similar to Oslo. Low-
skilled service and construction workers are more at risk than others, while in-
dividual factors such as gender and education have little effect. As in Oslo, 
structural factors related to their placement in different segments of the labour 
market are most important for understanding the risk of arbitrary treatment. In 
Copenhagen, precariousness is also strongly related to atypical employment, 
and a trade union representative in the firm, appears to have a much stronger 
effect on working conditions in Copenhagen than in Oslo. 
Compared to the case of Oslo, it appears that the Danish model of labour 
market regulation has been slightly more successful in ensuring a relatively 
egalitarian wage structure. However, a substantial minority of the Poles do not 
share the protection and benefits of the model. The comparatively stronger ef-
fect on wages and working conditions of trade union representation at the 
workplace illustrates one particular feature, namely that those who are ‘inside’ 
the organized labour market in Copenhagen enjoy stronger protection than in 
Oslo, but those who are outside seem to enjoy less (Arnholtz and Hansen, 2011; 
Larsen, 2011). 
 
Flexible universalism and low-wage incorporation in Reykjavik 
In absolute terms, Iceland has received far fewer Polish migrants than other 
Nordic countries. However, it has by far the smallest labour force of the Nordic 
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countries (only 180,000), and in relative terms it was the top receiver of Polish 
migrant workers from 2004 to the financial crisis of 2008. The crisis led to a 
collapse in the booming construction industry and devaluation of the króna by 
over 70 percent, which caused a halt (and to some extent reversal) in migration 
flows. Reykjavik nevertheless still boasts a substantial population of Polish 
migrants. In terms of age and education levels they do not differ significantly 
from their counterparts in Oslo or Copenhagen. However, in contrast to the 
male-dominated populations of Oslo and Copenhagen, their gender distribution 
is almost equal (55:45), and transnational family arrangements are far less 
common here, as only 10 percent report a spouse in Poland. Reykjavik is also 
where Polish migrant workers are found within the most diverse range of sec-
tors, including construction, manufacturing and fish-processing and a wide 
range of low-skilled services including several types of customer-related ser-
vices. This distribution reflects a partial acceptance of English as the working 
language in many service occupations, especially before the crisis.  
Until the financial crisis, Icelandic debates over social dumping centred 
around the growing unregulated industry of international temporary staffing 
agencies, which supplied thousands workers for the construction of a large hy-
droelectric power plant in the country’s remote interior. The controversy came 
to an end with the adoption of new legislation forcing these operations to adhere 
to Icelandic labour regulation, which in combination with the crisis led to the 
virtual disappearance of temporary staffing agencies after 2008 (Thorarins, 
2013). Since then, the issue of social dumping has been overshadowed by the 
economic crisis. Nonetheless, Iceland appeared to have a stronger framework 
for dealing with social dumping than any of the other Nordic countries. First of 
all, it has one of the highest rates of unionization and collective agreement cov-
erage in the world. Second, statutory regulations were already commonly ap-
plied in Iceland, as minimum provisions of collective agreements are routinely 
made legally binding for all workers. 
Before the crisis, Iceland was one of the most attractive destinations in Eu-
rope in terms of nominal wages, but since the devaluation of the króna, the val-
ue of Icelandic wages against foreign currency has plummeted. Our respondents 
report that they earn on average the equivalent of about 30 złoty – a meagre 
income compared to those earned by Poles in Oslo or Copenhagen, but still 
almost twice as much as their average earnings before leaving Poland (Table 2). 
The earnings of Polish migrant workers in Reykjavik are also substantially low-
er than those of native Icelandic workers: on average their hourly wages are 
about 55 percent of the average Icelandic wage, also well below the relative 
wages of Poles in Oslo and Copenhagen. The purchasing power provided by 
their earnings in Iceland is also substantially lower (55–59%) than that of Poles 
in Oslo and Copenhagen. To understand why migrant workers in Iceland earn 
relatively less compared to natives we once again turn to the construction sector 
to illustrate. 
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Minimum provisions for unskilled workers in the Icelandic collective 
agreement in construction are set at only 53 percent of average wages, com-
pared to 61 percent in Norway and 62 percent in Denmark. Thus, though fewer 
than one in ten Polish construction workers in Reykjavik earn below the mini-
mum wage for unskilled workers, the collective agreement in construction of-
fers large scope for wage flexibility. The relatively low wage floor – which 
rarely applies to native workers – appears to have become the norm for Polish 
migrant workers in Reykjavik. Only a minority receive wages equal to the min-
imum provisions for skilled workers, even though the majority of construction 
workers do have skills. This means that as long as migrant workers are defined 
as ‘unskilled’ and receive the minimum wage, the Icelandic collective agree-
ment enables considerable wage differences between native and migrant work-
ers, without breaching collectively bargained and legally binding minimum 
provisions. 
While the Reykjavik Poles are worse off in terms of earnings than their 
compatriots in Oslo and Copenhagen, they are far better off in terms of access 
to regular employment and reduced risk of arbitrary and exploitative treatment. 
Unlike their counterparts in Oslo and Copenhagen, the majority of Polish mi-
grants in Reykjavik – indeed 80 percent – are permanently employed by Ice-
landic companies (Table 3). Fixed-term contracts are rare, and the use of tempo-
rary staffing agencies, Polish subcontractor firms and various forms of self-
employment are almost non-existent. Neither do we find any noteworthy market 
for domestic service provision or undeclared work, both of which (usually in 
combination) provide an important labour market for Polish migrants in Oslo 
and Copenhagen. As a result, they have much lower risk of experiencing any of 
our indicators of precarious and exploitative conditions (Table 4). ‘Only’ 27 
percent of the Reykjavik sample report that they have been cheated out of pay 
by their employer (a result which may be explained by the sudden devaluation 
of the króna); 12 percent report that they have worked overtime without addi-
tional pay; 9 percent have received threats of being fired; 10 percent do not have 
a written work contract and 8 percent are unable to take paid sick leave. Overall, 
38 percent of the Polish workers report that they have experienced at least one 
of these issues during their stay in Iceland, and 26 percent in their current job in 
Reykjavik. All of these indicators are significantly lower than in the two other 
cities, where such occurrences are clearly related to the widespread use of atyp-
ical forms of employment. Moreover, the incorporation of Polish migrants into 
regular employment made them eligible for public unemployment benefits, at a 
time when unemployment sky-rocketed in wake of the crisis. In Norway, this 
was only partially the case, because of the high rates of atypical and informal 
employment. Thus, the relative flexibility within Icelandic wage-setting institu-
tions,  as well as flexible rules on hiring and firing, have reduced the incentives 
to bypass regulations or avoid employer responsibility through the use of inter-
mediaries and subcontractors. The universal and encompassing nature of Ice-
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landic labour regulation also makes this more difficult. However, this universal 
and flexible model has allowed considerable low-wage competition within the 
regular labour market. In a time of crisis, this has translated into very low earn-
ings for Polish migrants. 
 
Discussion 
Each Nordic country has its own historical traditions of regulating work and 
welfare, and there is no universal answer as to how the challenges of an increas-
ingly mobile and  unequal European labour market will be met by national 
states. However, the comparative analysis presented here sheds light on the 
particular challenges facing each of these three countries. In Oslo, our results 
suggest that the Norwegian turn from a system based on voluntary collective 
arrangements towards ad hoc universalism in the form of legal extensions of 
collective agreements, new statutory regulations regarding employer responsi-
bilities and increased control and enforcement by the state, has been highly 
warranted. This move has been a partial success in terms of upholding a rela-
tively high wage level among migrant workers, but not in terms of protecting 
them from arbitrary treatment. This development has taken the form of a ‘race’ 
between attempts by the government and the social partners to fill regulatory 
loopholes on the one hand, and strategic circumvention on behalf of employers 
seeking to minimize costs and risks through subcontracting and various forms 
of atypical and precarious employment on the other. As the political discussions 
slowly move from a simple focus on wage dumping, towards a longer-term 
concern for welfare state sustainability in a context of record levels of labour-
related immigration, questions regarding employment security and social inte-
gration may move to the forefront of debate. 
The Danish response to international mobility has been to continue its histor-
ical traditions of collective bargaining. Considerable concern about social 
dumping raised the issues of state regulation to the public agenda, but so far the 
majority of trade unions and employers’ organizations oppose political regula-
tion of wage levels. Our analysis shows that Polish migrants in Denmark are 
relatively better off compared to native workers than in Oslo. Nevertheless, they 
face many of the same risks, but in a system that is legally less clear. Our results 
suggest the development of a two-tier system of inclusion, especially in sectors 
such as construction. It seems that while those inside the organized labour mar-
ket enjoy more protection than their counterparts in the other Nordic countries, 
those who are left outside enjoy less. However, the distinction between ‘inside’ 
and ‘outside’ is less than clear cut, with both legal provisions, collective agree-
ments and the presence of local trade unionists playing their part. 
In Reykjavik, the Icelandic system of flexible universalism – where statutory 
regulations apply automatically to everyone, but with considerably more leeway 
for low-wage competition within the existing regulatory system – has in some 
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ways ‘succeeded’ in incorporating migrant workers into the existing framework 
of employment, though only after a fierce battle against the temporary staffing 
industry. This ‘success’ comes at the cost of extensive low-wage competition 
within the system. In the midst of pressing economic challenges, Iceland’s abil-
ity to incorporate new migrants may well be more related to applying systems 
for approving foreign educational credentials, and providing language training, 




Our analysis shows that all three capital cities are faced with challenges regard-
ing the institutional ability to incorporate new migrant workers into existing 
labour market structures and protect them from exploitative and precarious con-
ditions. 
Some of these challenges relate to certain broad patterns similar in all three 
cities. Educational qualifications have some bearing on Polish migrants’ posi-
tion in their Nordic host countries, but our analysis suggest that labour market 
outcomes are much less related to individual characteristics and human capital 
than to their structural position in the host country labour market. Despite varied 
educational and occupational backgrounds, Polish migrants are primarily re-
cruited to perform work requiring few formal skills within a quite narrow set of 
industries. They are usually found low on the status ladder of domestic labour 
markets, earning significantly lower wages than natives, and experiencing far 
more precarious and in many cases exploitative working conditions. This gen-
eral trend seems to be the result of segmentation into specific low-wage and 
low-status sectors, combined with an overrepresentation in the use of atypical 
forms of employment. Thus, workers within low-skilled services and parts of 
the construction industry appear to be particularly at risk compared to those 
working in other parts of the labour market. 
However, we find differences between the three cities, in terms of how risks 
and rewards are structured among the new migrant workers, as well as in how 
these challenges have been met. In both Oslo and Copenhagen, the labour mar-
ket for Polish migrant workers is structured into different segments, where cas-
ual employment relations, temporary staffing, transnational subcontracting and 
household service provision function as drivers of low-wage competition and 
precarious working conditions. In Copenhagen, however, being inside or out-
side the system of collective bargaining (measured by having a trade union rep-
resentative at the workplace) has a much stronger bearing on outcomes than in 
Norway, leaving those outside much more exposed to substandard conditions. 
In Reykjavik, outcomes are structured differently, and few of the factors which 
explain wage variation in Copenhagen or Oslo have any significant effect. In-
stead, it seems that the relatively flexible and universal Icelandic regime has 
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placed Polish migrants more uniformly at the bottom of the wage scale, alt-
hough with far better protection against exploitative conditions. 
The outcomes for Polish migrants in terms of wage levels and risk of precar-
ious conditions appear to be inversely correlated at the city level; Oslo being the 
most rewarding destination in monetary terms, but also the place where migrant 
workers are most at risk of exploitative and illegal treatment; Reykjavik is the 
least profitable destination in terms of earnings, yet at the same time migrants 
are least at risk of exploitative treatment. Which of the two should be consid-
ered the more successful in protecting migrant workers? This depends on what 
is considered more valuable: high wages or secure terms of employment. 
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1.  It has been common to assume that an RDS sample should be twice as 
large as an ordinary random sample in order to produce estimates of equal 
accuracy (Salganik, 2006). However, recent developments in RDS compu-
tation have enabled more accurate calculation of design effects based on 
the degree of homophily (tendency for in-group recruitment) within the 
sample (Wejnert et al., 2012). We applied the same technique to the Oslo 
survey, and found design effects on key variables to vary between 1.28 and 
2.35. This leaves us with 95 percent confidence intervals of 3-5 percentage 
points on each side of our estimated values. We compared our data to 
available official data on key indicators, and found that the surveys provid-
ed quite accurate estimates (Friberg, 2013). 
2.  In the 2010 survey, 31 percent reported a spouse in Poland, compared to 49 
percent in a similar survey conducted in 2006. 28 percent in both surveys 
were single.  
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